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SCENE: Somewhere in the world two aliens are discussing
their desire to obtain green cards1 and come to the
United States to work.
FIRST AMEN: "I was told I couldn't work in the United
States until I got a labor certification."
SECOND ALIEN: "I was told I couldn't get a labor certifica-
tion until I got a job in the United States."
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1. Permanent residence, green card, and resident alien are some of the
terms used to designate the status of an individual lawfully admitted for
permanent residence. Section 101 (a) (20) of the Immigration and National-
[voL. 14: 76, 1976] Labor Certification Requirement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVI3W
INTRODUCTION
Unfortunately, the provisions of section 212 (a) (14) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act 2 appear to present the contradiction
described in the above colloquy. In reality, the contradiction is
created more in actual practice by employers 3 than in the theory of
labor certification.4 Nevertheless, major problems concerning labor
certification procedures do exist. This article will discuss the cur-
rent problems of labor certification procedure by tracing the admin-
istrative process from application to review of denials and judicial
review from jurisdiction to remedy.
In its eleven-year existence the wording of section 212 (a) (14) has
engendered criticism from the Department of Labor,5 the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States,6 leading authorities in im-
ity Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (20) (1970) [The Immigration and Nationality
Act is hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act.]. The references to the statute will
be to the Act and to the United States Code, for the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service generally uses citations to the Act in its correspondence
and other documents. For a full discussion of the procedure for immigrat-
ing to the United States, see Comment, How to Immigrate to the United
States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 193 (1976).
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-571 (Oct. 20, 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Amendment], which
become effective January 1, 1977, amending Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, amending B U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1952). See
generally Afterword: Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1976 [hereinafter cited as Afterword], 14 SAx D o L. Rav. 326, 29-30,
33-34 (1976).
3. The law requires merely a job offer before certification may be issued
and, in some cases, a job offer is, in theory, not even required. See text
accompanying notes 27-28 infra for a discussion of labor certification regu-
lations and procedure. However, many employers will not apply for labor
certification for an employee who has not demonstrated on-the-job capabil-
ity, and other employers will not offer employment to aliens who do not
have permanent residence.
4. The requirement of the I. & N. Act § 212 (a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)
(14) (1970) is commonly referred to as "labor certification." 29 C.F.R. §
60.1 (1976).
5. E.g., Hearings on S. 3074 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-
61 (Mar.-Apr. 1976).
6. 38 Fed. Reg. 16840 (1973). See 51 INEmRPSETER RELEASES 1 (1974).
The Administrative Conference of the United States was established by
Congress to study the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administra-
tive procedures of federal agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 571 (1970).
migration practice,7 the Comptroller General of the United States,8
and Congress. The criticism has not all been directed at the same
problem, and proposed solutions vary. This article addresses only
the criticism and guidance provided in judicial decisions which con-
cern administrative procedures. As the House Committee on the
Judiciary noted:
[T]he current administration of this provision by the Depart-
ment of Labor has not been satisfactory. The labor certification
program is a complex one-partly because of the complexity of the
immigration law itself and partly because of the failure of the De-
partment of Labor to explain adequately the program to the public
or even to the Congress, with whom it has been generally uncoop-
erative. As a result, the program is operating with little in the way
of public understanding, and the Department of Labor's efforts to
implement this program have been attacked by courts and com-
mentators alike as being arbitrary, unfair and violative of the Free-
dom of Information Act.9
Approximately 60,000 to 70,000 applications for alien labor certifi-
cation are filed each year.10 Of those, about 40,000, or about 65 per-
cent, are approved." This represents about 10 percent of the quota
immigrants12 entering the United States each fiscal year. Although
the impact of the labor certification procedure has been minimized
by those responsible for its administration,13 the impact is extreme-
7. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 981 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, at 187 (1973) (testi-
mony of Jack Wasserman, Esq.). See Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our
Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 1, 11 (1975); Manulkin & Maghame,
A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Undocumented Mexican Alien
Worker, id. at 42, 51-52.
8. ComPoLi- R GmERmL, House Comm. on the Judiciary, ADivmSTRA-
TION OF THE ALIEN LABOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED
(May 16, 1975).
9. Id. at 23, discussing and quoting from H.R. REP. No. 93-461, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1973) (emphasis added).
10. Hearings on S. 3074 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Nat-
uralization, Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (Mar.-
Apr. 1976).
11. Id. at 84-85.
12. Quota immigrants are not entitled to immediate relative status under
I. & N. Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970). The number of quota
immigrants is essentially limited to 390,000 per fiscal year. Since January
1, 1968, the number of "special" or Western Hemisphere immigrants has
been limited to 120,000 per year by id. § 101(a),(27), 8 7J.S.C. § 1101(a)
(27). Pursuant to the 1976 Amendments, the Western Hemisphere numer-
ical limitation will be set forth in the 1976 Amendment § 201 (a) (2).
The number of Eastern Hemisphere immigrants is limited to 170,000
per year byI. &N. Act § 201 (a), 2 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
13. (Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment and
Training, Dep't of Labor):
It is clear that the present labor certification procedures are a
costly, aggravating process which affect a very small percentage
of the immigrants who enter the labor force. In terms of either
population or work force, the numbers entering for employment
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iy significant to each alien applicant for certification. Apparently,
the labor certification requirement affects a far greater percentage
of aliens aspiring to enter the United States as permanent residents
than of those aliens who actually enter. Because about 90 percent
of those actually entering the United States as permanent residents
do so on the basis of family relationships, a fair assumption is that
the overwhelming majority of those desiring entry but found inel-
igible are precluded under the labor certification requirement.'4
Thus the impact from the aspiring alien's viewpoint is significant.
The concern expressed over the manner in which the Department
of Labor administers the labor certification program is not merely
an academic exercise; rather it is a legitimate pursuit of those inter-
ested in having a system of immigration law and procedure which
is consistent with America's long history of encouraging immigra-
tion and our tradition of due process.
Not all the problems which have arisen from the labor certifi-
cation requirement are related to its administration. Some of the
problems generated by the provisions of section 212 (a) (14) are re-
lated to its apparent dual purpose
to admit and absorb into our citizenry skilled workers from other
lands who would make a contribution to our society, and to protect
our own workers by excluding aliens whose entry might deprive
our citizens of comparable jobs.15
In part, this dichotomous statutory objective has created the diffi-
culties encountered to date. However, the Department of Labor
may not rely on the statutory objective of protecting workers in the
United States as a complete justification for its policies and deci-
sions. As the courts and commentators have frequently noted, it is
purposes are not significant. The only way that such numbers
could adversely affect U.S. workers would be if they were entering
in concentrations in a particular occupation or in a single employ-
ing establishment in a given area over a relatively short period of
time.
But see Keeley, Effects of U.S. Immigration Law on Manpower Charac-
teristics of Immigrants, 12 DEmOGRAPHY 179 (1975).
14. 1. & N. Act §§ 201(b), 203(a) (1), (2), (4), (5), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b),
1153(a) (1), (2), (4), (5) (1970), and the exception specified in id. §
212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1970). This statement is based on the
assumption that in addition to approximately 30,000 aliens whose labor
certification is denied, countless thousands more never initiate the immigra-
tion process because they know they cannot obtain the required certifica-
tion.
15. Digilab, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 495 F.2d 323, 326 (1st Cir. 1974).
the fundamental inadequacies in the Department of Labor's admin-
istration of the statutory responsibility assigned by section 212(a)
(14) which is the cause of most of the current problems."
STATUTORY BASES FOR ALEN LABOR CERTIFICATIONS
AND THEm EFFECTS
The statutory foundation for alien labor certification is section
212 (a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended in
October 1976.17 This provision requires that aliens who intend to
enter the United States as immigrants must possess an alien labor
certification unless they are exempted from the requirement
16. See notes 5-9 supra.
17. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1970), provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of
aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded
from admission into the United States:
(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose
of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of
Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and
to the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers
in the United States who are able, willing, qualified and available
at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United
States and at the place to which the alien is destined to perform
such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such
aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions
of the workers in the United States similarly employed. The exclu-
sion of aliens under this paragraph shall apply to special immi-
grants defined in Section 101 (a) (27) (A) (other than the parents,
spouses or children of United States citizens or of aliens lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent residence), to prefer-
ence immigrant aliens described in Section 203 (a) (3) and (6) and
to non-preference immigrant aliens described in Section 203 (a5 (8).
The 1976 Amendment changes the wording of § 212 (a) (14) to conform to
the new world-wide preference system. The amendments also include
substantive changes in the wording of the labor certification provision.
These changes will be discussed briefly in appropriate footnotes infra.
See generally Afterword 326.
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of
performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of
Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers
who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case
of aliens who are members of the teaching profession or who
have exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts), and available
at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United
States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled
or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will
not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the
workers in the United States similarly employed. The exclusion
of aliens under this paragraph shall apply to preference immi-
grant aliens described in section 203 (a) (3) and (6), and to non-
preference immigrant aliens described in section 203 (a) (8) ....
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because of a familial relationship,' 8 they are not coming to the
United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled
labor,19 or they are otherwise statutorily exempted.
2 0
The statutory scheme places the alien who is without a required
labor certification in the same position as aliens who are mentally
retarded,2' prostitutes, 22 or narcotics smugglers. 23 Aliens not in
possession of a valid labor certification may be subject to exclusion-
ary proceedings when they reach the United States. In addition, an
alien who is a nonimmigrant and who applies for adjustment of sta-
tus to that of a lawful permanent resident is subject to exclusion.
24
Therefore, he too is required to possess valid labor certification. If
an alien has entered as an immigrant or has adjusted status on the
basis of a defective25 labor certification, he is subject to deporta-
tion. 26 Similarly, an alien who has erroneously claimed exemption
from the labor certification requirement is deportable.
LABOR DEPARTMIV-T REGULATIONS ANDI PROCEDURES
The framework for processing labor certification applications by
the Department of Labor is set forth in the Code of Federal Regula-
18. See note 14 supra. See generally J. WASSERmAN, ImMGRATION LAW
AND PRACTICE (ALI-ABA, 1973), for the relationships exempted from labor
certification under the current (pre-1977) law.
19. Examples of such immigrants are children, retired people, substantial
investors, and the independently wealthy who are without regular employ-
ment. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8 (b) (1976).
20. E.g., registry cases pursuant to I. & N. Act § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259
(1970), for those who entered the United States prior to June 30, 1948.
Such statutory exemptions are very rare and are of limited importance.
21. Id. § 212(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1).
22. Id. § 212(a) (12), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (12).
23. Id. § 212(a)'(23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (23).
24. Id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
25. See, e.g., In re Ortega, 13 I. & N. Dec. 606 (BIA, 1970); In re Wel-
come, 13 I. & N. Dec. 352 (BIA, 1969); In re Klein, 12 I. & N. Dec. 819
(BIA, 1968).
26. I. & N. Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970). The specific exclusion
charge need not be made under section 212 (a) (14); a proper charge may
also be made under section 212 (a) (19). However, the recent decision of
the Supreme Court in Reid v. INS, 429 U.S. 619 (1975), suggests that the
INS should charge the alien under section 212 (a) (20). By charging under
this section, the alien is denied the relief afforded by section 241(f). But
see Hyung Dae Kim v. INS, Civil No. 75-2154 (3d Cir., July 21, 1976), in-
volving a labor certification, and Persaud v. INS, 537 F.2d 776 (3d Cir.
(1976), for apparently contradictory results.
tions.2 7 After briefly summarizing the purpose and scope of immi-
grant labor certification processing,28 the regulations describe their
geographic applicability,29 the Manpower Administration regions,30
and their areas of responsibility.31 The Secretary of Labor has del-
egated his responsibility for determinations to a "Certifying Officer
appointed by the Assistant Regional Director for Manpower
[RMA] 32 of the Department of Labor for the area wherein the
employment is to occur."33 Requests for review of the certifying
officer's decision are directed to the Assistant RMA for the area
in which the denial occurred.
34
In order to facilitate the processing of requests, certain advance
determinations of labor certification are set forth in the regula-
tions.3 5 Currently, two schedules are provided, one for categories of
employment considered pre-certified 0 and another for categories of
27. 29 C.F.R. § 60 (1976). Newly proposed regulations appeared in the
Federal Register on November 5, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 48938 (1976). These
regulations, if finally adopted, will make major changes in labor certifica-
tion procedures. In addition the Secretary of Labor has proposed that the
new regulations be published in title 20, part 656 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. Id. The reader should consult the Federal Register for an
indication of the final content and effective date of the new regulations.
Although I. & N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (1970), places
the responsibility for making the labor certification decision on the Secre-
tary of Labor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Department
of State do have procedural, and in some circumstances, substantive roles.
See text accompanying notes 132-74 infra.
28. 29 C.F.R. §§ 60.1(a) & (b) (1976).
29. Id. § 60.1(c). The regulations are applicable to the fifty states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
30. In 1976 the designation of this division of the Department of Labor
was changed from Manpower Administration to Employment and Training
Administration. (The change reflects the trend to avoid sexist designations
in government agencies.) In addition to their responsibility for issuing
labor certifications, the Employment and Training Administration is re-
sponsible for many other programs.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 60.1(d) (1976).
32. The position is now entitled Assistant Regional Director for Employ-
ment and Training. For brevity's sake and because the Code of Federal
Regulations is, at the time of writing, using the prior terminology, the ap-
pellation, "Assistant RMA," will be used throughout the article.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 60.4(a) (1976).
34. Id. § 60.4(b). However, the proposed regulations (§ 656.26) provide
for review through the Office of the Chief Administrative Law Judge of
the Department of Labor. 41 Fed. Reg. 48938 & 48944 (1976). See text
accompanying notes 132-74 infra for a full discussion of administrative
review of labor certification denial.
35. 29 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1976).
36. Id. § 60.2(a) (1) designates Schedule A as a list of employment cate-
gories for which determination has been made that "there are not sufficient
workers who are able, willing, qualified and available for employment" and
whose employment will have no adverse effect on United States citizens.
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employment for which certification may not be issued.37 All the
pre-certified occupations, listed on Schedule A, are in health and re-
ligious fields.38 All the occupations which may not now be cer-
tified, listed on Scheduled B, require only minimal training.39
A third schedule, Schedule C, was promulgated in 1967 but is not
presently in use. Schedule C pre-certified highly skilled occupa-
tions found to be in short supply in certain regions so long as the
alien worked only in the designated geographic area. On February
9, 1970, the Secretary of Labor, without first publishing in the Fed-
eral Register, suspended Schedule C. This action was challenged as
violative of the Administrative Procedure Act.40 The Second Cir-
cuit held in Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, that publication of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register was required since the
cancellation "changed existing rights and obligations" of aliens of
the class. 41 The Lewis-Mota decision casts doubt upon those regula-
tions42 which empower the Secretary to make revisions of the
Schedules Without notice.
Three forms are used in a labor certification application. Form
MA 7-50A, Statement of Qualifications of Alien,43 requires a de-
scription of the alien's educational and work experience. It also
37. Id. § 60.2(a) (2) designates Schedule B as categories of employment
for which certification may not be made.
38. Id. § 60.7, Schedule A, as of October 25, 1976, pre-certified individuals
meeting minimum qualifications in dietetics, medicine and surgery, nursing,
pharmacy, physical therapy, and certain religious pursuits. The proposed
regulations of November 5, 1976, have made substantial changes in the
occupations which are considered precertified on schedule A.41 Fed. Reg.
48938 (1976). By notice on March 26, 1976, the Department of Labor
removed nurses from the pre-certification category for the New York
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Id. at 12654. All other categories
of employment are precertified nationwide. The Health Professions Edu-
cational Assistance Act of October 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, 90 Stat.
2243, in its Findings and Declarations of policy, states that there is no
shortage of physicians and surgeons and there is no further need to admit
alien physicians. This statement is clearly aimed at removing medical
doctors from Schedule A.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 60.7, Schedule B (1976).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
41. 469 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1972). Subsequent publication effectu-
ated the cancellation. Query: Would a challenge to the cancellation of pre-
certification for nurses in the New York area (see note 38 supra) be suc-
cessful? The change was published but without a thirty-day delay period.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 60.2(b) (1976).
43. Id. § 60.3(e) (1).
asks for information about the prospective employer and area of
employment.4 4 This form is signed by the alien-applicant.
Form MA 7-50B, Job Offer for Alien Employment14 requires a
description of the alien's prospective employment in the United
States and is signed by the prospective employer. He must describe
the job, proposed wages, and efforts made to fill the job. The form
warns the prospective employer not to employ a nonimmigrant
alien who cannot show work authorization. It also states that the
employer of an alien without work authorization is subject to hav-
ing labor certification for that alien denied. However, no law or au-
thorized regulation supports this sanction. The current regulations
state that the "form [MA 7-50B] is modified to the extent that an
employer is not subject to a denial of certification on the ground of
employing an alien who works without authorization."4 6 The regu-
lation authorizing the "penalty" language was removed in February
1971, for being beyond the scope of the authorizing legislation.47
The forms containing the provision, first printed in April 1970, have
not been changed. 48
The third form specified for use in applying for labor certification
is Form MA 7-50C, Supplemental Statement for Live-at-Work Job
Offers.49 It is used to provide a description of the alien's prospec-
tive living and working conditions for jobs in which the alien is re-
quired to live in the employer's home.
The regulations set forth procedures for applying for labor certifi-
cation. 50 However, these procedures are not complete because of
the roles the Act assigns to the Immigration and Naturalization
44. The Form MA 7-50A also contains, in block 19, a question concerning
placement services and fees. Although id. § 60.3 (e) (1) states that this in-
formation need not be answered, the form itself has not been changed.
45. Id. § 60.3 (e) (2).
46. Id.
47. 36 Fed. Reg. 2462 (1971).
48. At a presentation before the Association of Immigration and Nation-
ality Lawyers in May 1972, Charles E. Odell for Robert J. Brown, Acting
Associate Manpower Administrator for the United States Employment Serv-
ice, Department of Labor, indicated that the language remained on the
forms because they had already been printed and distributed before the
change in the regulation and ". . . [w]hen redesigning the forms, the De-
partment of Labor will exclude the reference to 'sanction.'" This statement
was made more than fifty months ago. No change has yet occurred.
49. 29 C.F.R. § 60.3(e) (3) (1976). The back of this form contains re-
quirements for additional documentation which must accompany the appli-
cation for certification of a live-in job.
50. Id. §§ 60.3 (a)- (d).
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Servicer1 (INS) and to the State Department.52 Additionally, the
Labor Department regulations do not address such factors as the
differences between Eastern- and Western-Hemisphere chargeable
aliens 53 and the job opportunities for members of the professions or
for people possessing exceptional ability in the sciences or arts.54
Visa availability55 also must be consulted in order to determine
whether a Schedule A or a PSA-NSA 56 alien may apply directly for
adjustment of status.57
The basic procedure used in applying for labor certification for an
alien who is not listed on Schedule A or B and is not a professional
or an individual with exceptional ability in the sciences or arts is to
have the prospective employer file the MA 7-50A and MA 7-50B
forms in duplicate with the appropriate local office of the State Em-
ployment Service."5 If the job requires the alien to live-in, Form
MA 7-50C must also be filed in duplicate. Each State determines
how it will handle the applications before forwarding them to the
certifying officer for decision.
51. E.g., adjudication of preference petitions, I. & N. Act §§ 204(a) & (b),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a) & (b) (1970).
52. E.g., id. § 221(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1).
53. The preference system established by id. § 203 (a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a),
has no application to the intending immigrant chargeable to the Western
Hemisphere quota. See id. §§ 201(a) & 202, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (a) & 1152.
However, as of January 1, 1977, the Eastern and Western Hemisphere will
have identical preference systems. See Afterword 327-29.
54. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(c) (4) (1976). These individuals are usually thought
of as belonging to the third preference category, which requires no job offer.
I. & N. Act § 203 (a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1183 (a) (3) (1970).
55. The State Departmnt publishes a monthly "Visa Bulletin" entitled
Availability of Immigrant Visa Numbers for (month-year). It may be or-
dered free from the Visa Office, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
United States Department of State, Washington, D.C.
56. Those professional, scientific, and artistic occupations not on Schedule
A are frequently referred to as PSA-NSA.
57. Adjustment of status from nonimmigrant to immigrant is available
for certain classes of Eastern Hemisphere aliens pursuant to I. & N. Act
§ 245, 8 U.S.C. § 255 (1970). 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(b) (1) (1976) permits
direct application in the nonpreference category (I. & N. Act § 203 (a) (8),
8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (8) (1970)) for Schedule A aliens and for PSA-NSA
aliens if visa numbers are current for the country in the nonpreference cate-
gory. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g) (1) (1976). For PSA-NSA applicants the MA
7-50A form is sent to the Department of Labor for determination of certifi-
cation. As of January 1, 1977, adjustment of status will also be available
to Western Hemisphere natives. See Afterword 330.
58. 29 C.F.R. § 60.3 (c) (1976).
An alien who is engaged in an occupation listed on Schedule A
but who is proceeding without a job offer may file Form MA 7-50A
in duplicate and fully documented with the United States Consul or
the Immigration and Naturalization Office. If after review the
Consular or Immigration Officer agrees the alien qualifies for
Schedule A, this decision is indicated on the forms. 0
Finally, the regulations outline the procedure for application by
a member of the professions or by an individual who has excep-
tional ability in the sciences or arts but who is not pre-certified on
Schedule A- 60 The individual may file Form MA 7-50A in dupli-
cate and fully documented 6' with either the United States Consul0 2
or with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. If the alien
qualifies for professional status, the Consul or Immigration and
Naturalization Service will forward the application to the certifying
officer for the place of intended employment. The certifying officer
will then determine whether to issue certification. Because the reg-
ulations are not complete, State Department 8 and INS 4 regula-
tions also should be consulted to determine all possible ways to file
an application for labor certification under a given set of circum-
stances. After having determined what may be done, counsel must
decide what should be done to obtain permanent residence as expe-
ditiously as possible.65
Once the application is received by the State Employment Serv-
ice, the actual processing and decisionmaking commence. This
process entails determining whether able, qualified, and willing
United States workers are available and whether the alien-appli-
59. Id. § 60.3(a). The decision of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service is final after INS review procedures are complete, id. § 60.3 (d).
However, the Assistant RMA may be requested to review a consular deci-
sion concerning the alien's qualifications, id. § 60.4 (b).
60. Id. § 60.3(b).
61. Id. § 60.3 (f).
62. The initial filing is with the appropriate United States Consul (id.
§ 42.110) in all Western Hemisphere cases. If an Eastern Hemisphere alien
is abroad, he or she may file either with the Consul or directly with Immi-
gration.
63. See id. § 42.91(a) (14); 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNOTATED IMMaIR-T
VISA REGULAOioNS, NOTES AND PROCEDuRAL NOTES To 42.91 (a) (14), in
FOREIGN ArTAnS MANUAL, pt. I. See also note 55 supra.
64. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(c), 204.2(e), 245.2(b), 245.1(g) (1976); INS,
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS §§ 204.4 and 245.2(c) (1974); Instructions of INS
Form 1-140, Petition to Classify Preference Status of Alien on Basis of Pro-
fession or Occupation.
65. The scope of this article allows neither a detailing of all possible
methods of application nor a discussion of the factors in the decision-making
process of how best to obtain labor certification and permanent residence.
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cant's employment will adversely affect wages and working condi-
tions of those similarly employed. On December 4, 1973, in response
to strong criticism by the Administrative Conference of the United
States,6 6 the Department of Labor Manpower Administration issued
a field memorandum implementing changes in its procedures.67
These instructions established the use of Form MA 7-147 as a trans
mittal sheet from the State Employment Service to the Assistant
RVEA. The MA 7-147, when completed, contains information con-
cerning availability, wages, the source of information, and the em-
ployer's recruiting efforts. The certifying officer or an assistant
(called an analyst) prepares a Form MA 7-146, which is used as the
worksheet for issuance of the final decision. 68 A decision is ren-
dered on Form MA 7-145, which in the case of denial is completed
with the information stating the basis for denial.
The revision in procedure is a vast improvement over procedures
existing before December 1973. However, intense criticism of De-
partment of Labor Alien Labor Certification procedures still exists.
The American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law, Com-
mittee on Immigration and Nationality recently issued a Report and
Recommendations,"9 which recommended "issuance of long delayed
regulations implementing the 1973 recommendations of the Admin-
istrative Conference,7" upgrading of procedure and the following
of court decisions.
' '71
66. See note 6 supra; 51 IERsPRsm RErm.sEs 1 (1974).
67. MANPOWER ADmNISTRATION, DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD MEmoRAzmUia No.
378-73 (Dec. 4, 1973) was issued to all Assistant RMA's. They in turn pre-
sumably disseminated the information to State Employment Service Offices
within their region-e.g., Regional Field Instruction, ADV No. 52-73, issued
by the Assistant RMA for Region III (at Philadelphia), Dec. 27, 1973.
68. Forms MA 7-146 and MA 7-147 are made available to the applicant
upon request, if the certification is denied and appeal is taken. See text
accompanying notes 132-74 infra.
69. May 1976.
70. See note 6 supra. In both May and December 1975, at liaison meet-
ings between the Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers and
the Department of Labor, officials of the Labor Department indicated a cur-
rent lengthy draft of the proposed regulations was in the process of or had
been reviewed by the Office of Solicitor. The proposed regulations of
November 5, 1976, represent a step toward improving labor certification
procedures. However, still greater efforts are needed. 41 Fed. Reg. 48938
(1976).
71. E.g., at a liaison meeting between the N.Y. Chapter, Association of
Immigration and Nationality Lawyers and officials of the N.Y. Regional Of-
The report concluded:
The foregoing report and recommendations are based on our con-
viction that extensive revisions are needed in the administration of
the labor certification program in order to assure its compliance
with the requirements of law and of fair play.
We urge the Department of Labor to take prompt action to adopt
and implement our recommendations.
72
fice, United States Department of Labor on March 10, 1976, the Labor De-
partment stated that it has always held that a district court decision is ap-
plicable only to the facts of that case.
72. An extract from the recommendations, quoted below, is instructive
of the problems faced by the practitioner attempting to obtain labor certifi-
cation for his client:
3. The Department of Labor should improve its facilities for
public information and communication in the following respects:
a. The long-delayed issuance of regulations implementing the
1973 recommendations of the Administrative Conference should be
published forthwith.
b. The Department of Labor should immediately inaugurate a
program, in compliance with the public information requirements
of 5 U.S.C. 552, to publish as regulations or otherwise make avail-
able to the public all interpretations, policy determinations, and de-
cisions adopted in its administration of the labor certification re-
quirement. The Department of Labor should designate and publish
specified decisions as precedents.
c. The Department of Labor should publish or otherwise make
available on a current basis its internal criteria for adjudicating
labor certification requests.
d. The Department of Labor should publish or otherwise make
available to the public current information regarding types of labor
certification requests granted and types denied.
4. The Department of Labor should make the following proce-
dural improvements in the labor certification process, in order to
assure compliance with the law and with the requirements of due
process:
a. Any denial of labor certification request should be based on
an adequate record, in which the evidentiary basis for the proposed
action is fully developed.
b. Any denial of labor certification request should be based on
substantial evidence or information incorporated in the record of
the proceeding.
c. No determination to deny a labor certification request should
be made before the applicant is given an opportunity to rebut any
evidence or information on which the proposed denial is predicated.
d. In order to promote uniformity and facilitate the correction of
errors, the Department of Labor should make provision for central-
ized review of labor certification denials in appropriate cases.
5. The Department of Labor should take steps to avoid reliance
on inadequate and erroneous criteria in adjudicating labor certifica-
tion cases, and particularly to follow court decisions in which such
errors are indicated. Among such improper criteria are the follow-
ing:
a. Use of inadequate and unreliable information, such as tele-
phone surveys and computer tabulations of supposedly available
workers.
b. Use of unrealistic criteria, ignoring the employer's needs and
alien's specialized skills, resulting in an unsupportable finding that
qualified workers are available to fill the open position.
c. Use of excessive geographic criteria of availability, disregard-
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After labor certification is obtained, the only remaining question
is its validity. Generally, labor certifications are valid for an indefi-
nite period of time.73 However, certifications for domestic workers
and teachers are excepted from this rule.7 4 Certifications issued
pursuant to Schedule A are limited to specified occupation and
geographic area set forth in Schedule A.75 Certifications for mem-
bers of the professions without job offers are limited to the intended
occupation and geographic area set forth in the MA 7-50A.7 6 Labor
certification issued pursuant to a job offer are limited to the job of-
fer specified in the particular geographic location.77 Once the alien
fulfills the conditions of the labor certification and assumes his job,
he is not precluded from "subsequently changing his occupation,
job, or area of residence.1
7 8
ABLE, WILLING, QUALIFIED, Am AVAILABLE
Job Description and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
Prior to the issuance of certification, the Secretary of Labor must
determine that sufficient workers are not available who are able,
willing, and qualified. He must also determine that the alien's em-
ployment will not adversely affect the wages and working condi-
tions of aliens similarly employed.7 9 Thus, the proper occupational
category of the alien must be determined.
The Department of Labor relies upon its Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles (D.O.T.) to identify the occupation in which the appli-
cant for labor certification is seeking work.8 0 This publication as-
ing the statutory directive that qualified workers must be available
at the place of intended employment.
COmm. ON IMIVGRATION & NATIONALITY, SECTION OF ADmIN. LAW, ABA, RE-
PORT AND RECOAnVENDATIONS (May 1976).
73. 29 C.F.R. § 60.5 (a) (1976). Period of time of validity is the time
by which permanent residence (visa) must be issued.
74. Id. § 60.5 (b) (1975). The concept of a limited period of validity was
approved in Maceren v. District Director, 509 F-2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1974).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 60.5 (e) (1) (1976).
76. Id. § 60.5(e) (2).
77. Id. § 60.5(e) (3).
78. Id. § 60.5 (f).
79. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1970).
80. BUREAU OF EvriLoyivm SEcuarT, U.S. DFP'T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY
OF OccuPATIONAL TITLEs vii (Supp. 1966) (3d ed. 1965). The third edition
of the D.O.T. is available for $5.00 from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
signs a six-digit numerical code to approximately 10,000 occupations
in the United States and defines customary duties. The numerical
code, which is placed on the bottom of the labor certification appli-
cation forms, is utilized by the appropriate state agencies and the
certifying officer to determine availability in the occupation. This
determination is made by consulting summaries of individuals reg-
istered with the state employment service under the designated
code.81
The Dictionary of Occupational Titles is by its nature very
general. Its authors noted the problem in a "Special Notice,"
which states:
The user should exercise caution in interpreting and applying the
information in this publication.... ET~he job definitions are
composite descriptions of jobs as they may typically occur, rather
than as they actually are performed in a particular establishment
or in a given locality.8 2
One example of the problems inherent in the D.O.T. is illustrated
by the fact that an application for a labor certification for an in-
structor in ceramics at an art institute and for a professor of inver-
tebrate zoology at a medical school will both be given D.O.T. code
090.228, Faculty Member. Consequently, availability statistics may
reflect an excess of zoology professors in the ceramics instructor's
application and vice versa.
D.O.T. codification was the basis for reversing the denial of a la-
bor certification in Yusuf v. RMA.83 The applicant in Yusuf had a
B.A. and an M.A. in Islamic Studies and a Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs.
Utilizing its Employment Security Automated Reporting System'8 4
the Department of Labor found an excess of 304 "faculty members"
in the region. The court remanded the case to the Department of
Labor, stating:
[T]he data relied upon by the Certifying Officer in denying plain-
tiff's application has virtually no probative value in determining the
availability of domestic workers with whom plaintiff would com-
81. Much of the criticism of the labor certification process relates to the
nature of these employment summaries. See text accompanying notes 83-
107 infra.
82. BuREAu OF EMPLOYMENT SECURTTY, U.S. DEP'T oF LABOR, DIcTioxARY
oF OccuPATIO xL TrrLns vii (Supp. 1966) (3d ed. 1965).
83. 390 F. Supp. 292 (W.D. Va. 1975).
84. The Employment Security Automated Reporting System (ESARS)
has been heavily relied upon by certifying officers and the Assistant RMA
to determine availability of workers. ESARS has essentially been discred-
ited as a basis for determining whether there are sufficient workers in the
United States "who are able, willing, qualified, and available" at the alien's
intended place of employment. See text accompanying notes 113-15 infra.
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pete for work. Such a lack of evidentiary basis for the administra-
tive decision is an abuse of discretion justifying judicial relief.85
Digilab, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,"6 was a similar case involving
the overgeneralization of an occupation based on the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles. In Digilab, the employer required an engineer
with a very specific combination of sdills 1S The Dictionary of Oc-
cupational Titles code assigned was Electrical Engineer, 003.081.
Availability statistics allegedly reflected 200 unemployed "electrical
engineers." The court commented:
"Electrical Engineers" in this age of intense specialization is far too
generic a term in determining whether any of them are qualified
in the particular field required by Digilab.
88
The case was remanded to the Department of Labor to obtain a
specific basis for the denial, one which did not involve vagaries such
as "electrical engineers." Unfortunately the Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles provides no greater specificity, and it is used in adjudi-
cating every labor certification application.8 9
Independent of the inadequacies of the D.O.T., courts have dis-
agreed with the Department of Labor's classification of alien appli-
cants for labor certification in relation to a particular peer group for
the purpose of determining "availability."90 Golabek v. RMA 91 was
one of the earliest cases which considered this issue. The case in-
85. 390 F. Supp. at 296. The 1976 Amendment addresses this problem.
The parenthetical phrase inserted in the new § 212(a) (14) is designed to
facilitate certification of "research scholars and exceptional members of
the teaching profession." See H.R. REP. No. 94-1553, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
10-11 (1976).
86. 495 F.2d 323 (1st Cir.), aff'g 357 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974).
87. Id. at 325 n.2.
88. Id. at 326.
39. As demonstrated, the six-digit code is inadequate but some certifying
officers have, on occasion, attempted to rely on the first three digits. This
results, for example, in a tax accountant being compared not only to all
other types of accountants (using six-digit code of 160.188) but also to a
lister in woodworking and to a chief (bank) examiner (using the three-
digit code 160). The result is even more absurd if the applicant is an ap-
plied statistician. Using the three-digit code, 020, ESARS would show
"availability" for occupations as diverse as aircraft weight analyst, applica-
tions engineer, and demographer.
90. AvaiZability used in this context throughout the remainder of the ar-
ticle is a shortened designation for lack of able, qualified, willing, and avail-
able workers and for lack of adverse effect.
91. 329 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
volved an alien-applicant for a lay teacher position in the Philadel-
phia parochial school system. Although teachers were available for
public schools, no one other than the alien had applied for the paro-
chial school job. At issue was whether public and parochial school
teachers were properly categorized as peers. The court noted that
"although the Administrator found that there might be qualified
and available applicants, there is nothing to indicate that those ap-
plicants would be 'able' and 'willing' to work for the Archdiocese." 2
Thus, the proper job classification should have been "Catholic
School Teacher" rather than "School Teacher," for the willingness
to assume the position is part of the job classification process. Simi-
larly, in First Girl, Inc. v. RMA, 93 the court held that secretaries
seeking full-time permanent jobs could not be included in the same
category as secretaries willing to work for an agency supplying tem-
porary help. 4
The job title95 utilized by the employer and alien is not as signifi-
cant as the job description"" in determining availability 7 In Rat-
nayake v. Mack,98 the employer, a Montessori School, indicated that
the job required a teacher certified by the Association Montessori
Internationale (A.M.I.). The labor department denied the alien ap-
plicant certification on the basis that unemployed American teach-
ers were available who could, with a minimum of training, perform
the employment described. The court held that the requirement for
an A.M.I. certified teacher was too restrictive, for other training and
certifying bodies for Montessori teachers existed. However, the
court also held that the labor department was incorrect in deciding
availability by determining whether "teachers" were available. The
court found that the employer was entitled to have a Montessori
teacher. 9
The labor department has asserted that it has the power to judge
the good faith of the employer and any necessary job qualifications.
92. Id. at 895.
93. 499 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1974).
94. Id. For a full discussion of the issue of job classification, see the
lower court opinion, First Girl, Inc. v. RMA, 361 F. Supp. 1339 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
95. Block 25 on the RU 7-50B Form and Block 13 on the MA 7-50 A
Form.
96. Block 30 on the MA 7-50B Form.
97. Reddy, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir.
1974).
98. 400 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1974).
99. Id. at 1212.
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The court in Digilab'00 answered this contention by stating that the
labor department "should not have the privilege of determining the
qualifications of any particular applicant for the job to be filled.
Nor without proof, should it have the right to attack the good faith
of an employer's personnel procedures."'01 However, two D.C. Cir-
cuit Court opinions'0 2 have to some extent challenged employer job
requirements. In Acupuncture Center of Washington v. Dunlop,0 3
the court determined that an employer's requirement for (among
other qualifications) an individual who spoke three specified Chi-
nese dialects was overly restrictive. The Court quoted favorably
from Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor.04
It is well within the Secretary's discretion to ignore employer spec-
ifications which he deems, in accordance with his labor market ex-
pertise, to be irrelevant to the basic job which the employer desires
performed.105
The statement is, in principle, a good one, but the court in Pesikoff
stretched the concept to hold that a request for certification of a
live-in domestic was "merely a personal preference" which the labor
department could properly ignore in denying certification because
live-out domestics were available. The majority opinion in Pesikoff
was severely criticized in a well-reasoned dissent and by the First
Circuit in Silva v. Secretary of Labor.'0 6 The Silva court character-
ized labor's position as "absurd" and Pesikoff's result as "Orwelli-
an."'
0 7
Able, Willing, Qualified, and Available
Most labor certification cases involve a review of a denial of cer-
tification based upon the certifying officer's determination that
100. Digilab, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 495 F.2d 323 (1st Cir.), affg 357
F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974).
101. Id. at 326.
102. Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1038 (1974); Acupuncture Center of Washington v. Dunlop, Civil
No. 74-1050 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 16, 1976), rev'g 364 F. Supp. 1038 (D.D.C. 1973).
103. Civil No. 74-1050 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 16, 1976), rev'g 364 F. Supp. 1038
(D.D.C. 1973).
104. 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).
105. Id. at 762.
106. 518 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1975).
107. Id. at 308 & 309. A recent district court decision cited Silva with
approval and criticized the Department of Labor's position that availability
of live-out workers is a proper basis for denying a request for a live-in
United States workers were available. Courts have generally ad-
dressed certification denials by holding the labor department to the
statutory standards of able, willing, qualified, and available.
The Department of Labor has attempted to argue that the re-
quirement for "qualified" domestic workers was the equivalent of
readily trainable workers. However, as one court noted, the au-
thority assumed by Labor was "well beyond any power that may
fairly be implied from the express terms of the statute."108 The
same court held that "trainable" workers did not meet the statutory
standards of "qualified" workers.10 9
Location is one factor used to determine whether United States
workers are willing and available and, perhaps, to some extent
ready.
If none of the available workers in the pertinent geographic re-
gion are willing to Work at a specific place of employment, the stat-
utory purpose is not well implemented by denying ... [the]
application.' 10
In Reddy v. United States Department of Labor,," the Fifth Circuit
properly pointed to the fact that both the statute and regulations
required findings to be made at the place of employment. The
court reversed the denial because the certifying officer had merely
attempted to determine whether workers were available "within
the United States.""
2
A number of cases have discussed the sufficiency of state employ-
ment services data and ESARS data. The cases have held that
merely stating that specified numbers of individuals are registered
is not a basis for finding that United States workers were able, will-
domestic. The court in Jadeszko v. Secretary of Labor, CA No. 75-2054
(E.D. Pa., July 13, 1976), stated that such reasoning was "Washingtonian
whimsy." Id. at 5.
108. Jersey Plastic Molders, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Civil No. 74-485,
at 10 (D.N.J., July 2, 1975) (designated "Not for Publication").
109. Id.
110. Ozbirman v. RMA, 335 F. Supp. 467, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Although
the Regional Manpower Administrator is named as party defendant in many
of these cases, the authors have been unable to determine why. The statu-
tory duty for certification is upon the Secretary of Labor, who has delegated
his authority to the Assistant Regional Director for Manpower and others
designated by the Assistant RMA
111. 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974).
112. Id. at 544. The 1976 Amendment changes the wording of § 212
(a) (14) to emphasize the "intent that the Secretary of Labor certify on
the basis of whether there are sufficient workers 'at the place' where the
alien is going, rather than in the United States as a whole." H.R. Rs.
No. 94-1553, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 14 (1976).
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ing, qualified, and available to perform the alien's proposed job.113
Although this is a strong majority position,11 4 large numbers of de-
nials have been and continue to be based on these types of data. The
applicant must be prepared to challenge a denial.
ADVERSE EFFECT ON WAGES AD WORKING CONDITIONS
The test for issuance of labor certification is essentially two-
pronged. The question of the availability of able, willing, and quali-
fied workers has previously been discussed. However, an alien
seeking labor certification is also required to demonstrate that his
employment will have no "adverse effect." 1 5 The basic definition
of this term indicates employment will be deemed to affect adverse-
ly wages and working conditions unless it appears that:
(a) the employment will be for wages no less than those prevail-
ing for U.S. workers similarly employed in the area of employ-
ment: ...
(b) That such employment will include the furnishing of fringe
benefits that prevail for U.S. workers similarly employed in the
area of employment;
(c) That such employment will involve adherence to prevailing
working conditions including customs in the area of employment
regarding the furnishing of board, lodging, and other facilities;
(d) That such employment will not involve positions (1) that are
vacant be cause the former occupants are on strike or are being
locked out in the course of a labor dispute or (2) the filling of
which is at issue in a labor dispute;
(e) That such employment will not involve any discrimination
with regard to race, creed, color, national origin, age, or sex; and,
113. Seo v. United States Dep't of Labor, 523 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975);
Shuk Yee Chan v. RMA, 521 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1975); Digilab, Inc.
v. Secretary of Labor, 495 F.2d 323 (1st Cir.), afi'g 357 F. Supp. 941 (D.
Mass. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); Secretary of Labor v. Farino,
490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973); Jadeszko v. Secretary of Labor, Civil No. 75-
2054 (E.D. Pa., July 13, 1976) (In discussing state statistics for live-out
workers, the Jadeszko court stated that such statistics were "fantasy not
fact" and that the Department of Labor's "number, 366 available workers
is pure bureaucratic prestidigitation." Id. at 7.); Gajjar v. RMA, Civil No.
76-4299 (N.D. Ill., May 7, 1976); Sherwin-Williams Company v. RMA, Civil
No. 76-220 (N.D. Ill., May 4, 1976); Yusuf v. RMA, 390 F. Supp. 292 (W.D.
Va. 1975); Bitang v. RMA, 351 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
114. But see Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974) (which relied on state data to prove live-out
workers were available).
115. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (14) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (B) (1970).
(f) That such employment or any term or condition thereof is not
contrary to any provisions of Federal, State, or local law.110
It is not surprising that because of these regulations a male hair-
dresser was denied labor certification despite his employer's insist-
ence that only a male would be satisfactory to the customers.117
Wages have proved to be a matter of great concern to certifying
and reviewing officers, but the decisions to date have almost uni-
formly found the Department of Labor's determination of the ap-
propriate wage to be based on improper standards. Two issues are
involved: (1) whether the certifying officer is measuring the wage
rate against the proper peer group,118 and (2) whether the wage de-
termined by the certifying officer to be necessary is itself properly
computed. 1 9 In addition, serious doubt exists about the propriety
of the regulation requiring the prevailing wage and of the definition
specified for prevailing wage.
20
In order to determine the proper peer group with which to com-
pare the applicant's wage the certifying officer must first classify
the applicant's job. Once the job is classified, the wage rate must
be measured against that of the appropriate peer groups. Problems
have arisen from the comparison of dissimilar groups. For exam-
ple, in Golabek v. RMA,' 21 the certifying officer compared the wage
scale of public school teachers with that of parochial schools. The
court held that the comparison was inappropriate because of the
dissimilarity in jobs.
In Reddy, Inc. v. Department of Labor,12 2 the applicant was a
mechanical engineer, but the wage rate applied was for a civil engi-
neer. Comparison was held improper because "[t] he phrase 'simi-
116. 29 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1976).
117. Witt v. Secretary of Labor, 397 F. Supp. 673 (D. Me. 1975).
118. See Reddy, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th
Cir. 1974); Golabek v. RMA, 329 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
119. See Naporano v. Secretary of Labor, 529 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1976);
Reddy, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974);
Ozbirman v. RMA, 335 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
120. Naporano v. Secretary of Labor, 529 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1976); Ozbir-
man v. RMA, 335 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
121. 329 F. Supp. 892, 896-97 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
122. 492 F.2d at 545. The court was, of course, referring to I. & N. Act
§ 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (1970), the labor certification require-
ment. The decision continued at 545:
If appellant were trained in the ministry but performing light
gauge steel work, the relevant wages and working conditions of
"the workers in the United States similarly employed" would be
those of persons performing light gauge steel work, which by the
Department's definition is mechanical engineer's work, and not the
wages and working conditions of ministers.
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larly employed' in (B) describes those persons performing the labor
referred to in the introductory clause of subsection (14) and in (A)
of that subsection."
1 23
We do not suggest that certifying officers routinely make errors
in wage determinations by comparing totally different job titles.
However, certifying officers do ignore such factors as length of time
in the position, experience, and fringe benefits.124 For example, it
is fundamental that longevity affects wage rate. Nevertheless, the
Department of Labor routinely requires wages for qualified but en-
try level applicants to meet the occupation's average wage. Thus,
an entry wage will be compared with an average wage which neces-
sarily includes the higher salaries of individuals with long terms of
employment. There is no adverse effect if the alien applicant is re-
ceiving the same wage as an American worker with the same qual-
ifications and experience. The courts have advocated this position
within the context of union wages. In Ozbirman v. RMA,'12 5 the
court indicated that "[b] y failing to consider whether a collectively
bargained wage offer would have an adverse effect on wages, the
Secretary of Labor has abused his discretion."' '26 Similarly, in Na-
porano v. Secretary of Labor,127 the Third Circuit flatly held that
a union wage, absent some evidence impugning the agreement,
"cannot be said to 'adversely affect' the wages and working condi-
tions of American laborers in the area."' 28 Of particular interest is
the court's analysis of the regulation which required that prevailing
wages be paid.' 29 The court questioned whether the regulation was
consistent with the governing statute.3 0 In Naporano, Ozbirman,
123. 429 F.2d at 545.
124. E.g., Ozbirman v. RMA, 335 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 472-73. Accord, Golabek v. RMA, 329 F. Supp. 892, 896 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
127. 529 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1976).
128. Id. at 537-38.
129. 8 C.F.R. § 60.6 (a) (1976).
130. 529 F.2d at 540 n. 9.
This definition of "prevailing wage" was formiuated by the Sec-
retary for use in connection with the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.
§ 276a. That Act requires the Secretary to establish a "prevailing
wage" rate for laborers and mechanics on contracts to which the
United States or the District of Columbia is a party. The Secre-
tary has obviously borrowed this "prevailing wage" formula from
Davis-Bacon and has applied it in this labor certification context.
However, the labor certification statute, S U.S.C. & 1182(a) (14)
and GoZabelk, the labor department would have required that the
alien applicant be paid more than his American co-worker for
identical work at the same place of employment. A challenge to
this regulation is long overdue, especially when one considers the
manner in which "prevailing wage" is determined under the regula-
tion.'
8 '
ADMIN TRATI REVIEW OF LABOR CERTCATION DENAL
Procedure
In the event labor certification is denied, the regulations provide
for administrative appeal to the Assistant RMA of the same area in
which the denial occurred.18 2 The appeal is termed a request for re-
view, and it must be made within ninety days of the date of denial.
The regulations do not specify the nature of the appeal. The re-
quest for review is required only to:
(1) Clearly identify the particular certification determination for
which review is sought;
(2) set forth the particular grounds on which request is based; and
(3) include all documents which accompanied the denial of certifi-
cation.183
The regulations do require that the review be carried out by the
Assistant RMA or his designated representative "who shall not have
participated in the appeal."' 8 4 The review may result in an order
to issue a certification for an affirmance of the denial. This decision
is the final step in the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
18
with which we are concerned here establishes a substantially dif-
ferent standard. It does not require that aliens be paid a "prevail-
ing wage", but rather that their wage not "adversely affect" the
wages of American workers. Because no attack is made on the
regulations as such, we pass this issue without deciding whether
the Secretary's regulations are consistent with the governing stat-
ute and confine our discussion to the Secretary's action regardless
of the legality of the regulations.
131. 8 C.F.R. § 60.6(a) (1976).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 60.4(b) (1976). The proposed regulations (§ 656.26)
provide for review of a Labor certification denial before a hearing office
designated by the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Department of
Labor in addition to other changes in review procedure. 41 Fed. Reg. 48938
& 48944 (1976).
133. 29 C.F.R. § 60.4(b) (1976).
134. Id.
135. Id. There is one case which permitted judicial review without any
request for review having been filed. Sugay v. RMIA, Civil No. 73-1539
(N.D. Ill., Oct. 19, 1973). The case is clearly distinguishable. The applica-
tion for labor certification was filed with the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service with a third preference petition. The alien was notified by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service that his petition had been de-
nied because his labor certification had not been approved and that "there
was no appeal from the denial." Id. at 9. It is strongly suggested that
administrative remedies be exhausted prior to requesting judicial review.
Labor certification denials on Form MA 7-145 contain instructions for re-
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However, nothing in the regulation prevents filing another request
for labor certification after the first one is denied either by the cer-
tifying officer or on review. Indeed, if the first application was de-
fective or new evidence becomes available, a new application will
frequently be preferable to administrative or judicial review. 80
The procedure on review now involves a request by the applicant
for the information upon which the denial was based and at least
partial compliance with that request by the certifying officer. This
was not always the situation. Until recently the form denial only
stated that certification could not be issued because workers were
available or because there would be an adverse effect.' 37 No further
explanation was provided. The information upon which the deci-
sion was based was difficult to obtain. Currently, certifying offi-
cers are making the data available upon request.138
Once the unsuccessful applicant has the information upon which
the denial is based, he may submit his request for review with sup-
porting documents. The ninety-day appeal period is generally not
extended by requests for information or documents. The request
for review need take no particular form. Letter "briefs" are rou-
tinely used. In Secretary of Labor v. Farino,139 the court outlined
an appropriate procedure for review. It indicated that the appli-
cant must have "an opportunity to litigate.' 1 40 Farino seems to in-
questing review. This information was added to the. form in November
1973, after recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the
United States. See 51 INTERPRETm RELEAsES 1 (1974).
136. See Baig v. RMA, Civil No. 74-550, at 5 (N.D. IM., Dec. 20, 1974).
137. E.g., Digilab, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 495 F.2d 323, 324 (1st Cir.
1974); Golabek v. RMA, 329 F. Supp. 892, 894 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
138. See text accompanying notes 27-78 supra. Forms MA 7-147 and MA.
7-146 are now generally supplied to the applicant during request for review
when demand is made for their production. The applicant should request,
in addition, all other data upon which the decision was based. The proposed
regulations (§ 656.25) would require the certifying officer to issue a notice
of findings setting forth the bases of his decision. 41 Fed. Reg. 48938 &
48944 (1976).
139. 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973).
140. Id. at 892. The court stated:
An acceptable procedure on remand to the agency need not include
a trial-type hearing. In general, it should be sufficient if the Re-
gional Manpower Administrator makes available to plaintiffs allthe information before him, and gives plaintiffs a reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond with affidavits and written argument. However,
it appears that an important issue in this case is the reliability of
the information-gathering procedures used by the Iflinois StateEmployment Service. Any procedure on 
remand must include an
opportunity to litigate this issue. One 
possibility is for the M n-
power Administrator to ask the state agency 
to give plaintiffs a
dicate that the applicant is entitled to personally appear before the
reviewing officer and is to present argument and examine witnesses.
At least one Assistant RMA has attempted to afford a Farino-type
hearing. However, judicial review of the subsequent denial found
the procedure defective because the staff member conducting the
hearing failed to communicate the information presented to the in-
dividual deciding the request for review.1 41 Difficulties are still en-
countered in seeking meaningful review because of the Department
of Labor's continued reliance on certain types of data and because
of its refusal to give credence to rebuttal evidence.
Impeachment of Evidence Used to Deny Certification
A United States district court may reverse a denial of a labor cer-
tification
where the Secretary or his delegate abuses his discretion by basing
the decision on evidence neither reliable nor sufficient for the find-
ing required by the statute.142
Plaintiffs in labor certification suits may demonstrate unreliability
and insufficiency in a variety of ways. Counsel should attempt to
utilize as many methods as possible in order to protect the adminis-
trative record. In Sherwin-Williams v. RMA,' 4 3 the Department of
Labor's evidence consisted of State Employment Service statistics,
evidence "shrouded in doubt."' 44 It is incumbent upon plaintiffs to
belie the statistics; otherwise, they stand as the only evidence in the
case. As the court noted in Secretary of Labor v. Farino:
If the report of the State Employment Service stood unimpeached,
we could not conclude that the Secretary's refusal to certify the
alien workers was "arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law."14
5
The application in Sherwin-Williams was for an organic chemist.
The certifying officer received information from the Illinois State
full explanation of its procedures, so that plaintiffs may respond
in writing. Alternatively, plaintiffs might be given an opportunity
to cross-examine the state officials about the information furnished
the defendants. The defendants themselves should be given the
first opportunity to work out an ,acceptable procedure.
Accord, Gajjar v. RMAU, Civil No. 75-4299 (N.D. Ill, May 7, 1976).
141. Yong v. RMA, 509 F.2d 243, 246 (9th Cir. 1975).
142. Sherwin-Williams Company v. RMA, Civil No. 76-220 (N.D. Ill., May
4, 1976). The court cites Shuk Yee Chan v. RMA, 521 F.2d 592 (7th Cir.
1975); First Girl, Inc. v. RMA, 499 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1974); Digilab, Inc.
v. Secretary of Labor, 495 F.2d 323 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840
(1974); Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg, 437 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1971); Bitang
v. BMA, 351 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Ill., 1972).
143. Civil No. 76-220 (N.D. Il, May 4, 1976).
144. Shuck Yee Chan v. RMA, 521 F.2d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 1975).
145. 490 F.2d 885, 895 (7th Cir. 1973).
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Employment Service (ISES) that twenty individuals were listed as
available for work while only four openings were listed with them.
The employer apparently did not request referrals from ISES.
However, the RMIA had approved other applications for chemists
during the same period. The court allowed the evidence to be of-
fered for impeachment purposes. 146 Other impeaching evidence
consisted of the employer's affidavits about the difficulty in finding
qualified United States chemists and of copies of "extensive want ad
listings" for such positions at the time the application was filed. Im-
peaching evidence of this nature, as Judge MacKinnon pointed out
in his dissent in Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor,147 tends to demon-
strate "the tension between the theoretical [employment service
data] and the actual availability of qualified workers."'148
Occasionally impeachment of Department of Labor evidence is ac-
complished by the evidence itself. In Hanif v. RMA,149 the record
revealed a January 19, 1973, letter to the certifying officer from the
Illinois State Employment Service stating that six floor inspectors
were registered with them and that none were available from the
union. The record also showed a January 25, 1973, letter from the
Illinois State Employment Service (ISES) to plaintiff's attorney
stating that ten floor inspectors were available on ISES listings and
that there was also union availability. The denial was reversed and
the case remanded to the Assistant RIMA for an agency hearing.
The lack of impeaching evidence may prove to be fatal. However,
counsel can impeach the statistics of the state agencies by placing
a job order'-" with the State Employment Service and requesting
referrals to the employer of any person registered with them-i.e.,
any individual who is available, willing, qualified, and who has abil-
ity in the specific occupation required by the employer. In Golabek
v. RMA,' 5' impeachment of the state agency statistics on elemen-
146. Civil No. 76-220, at 9. Compare Baig v. RMA, Civil No. 74-550
(N.D. Ill., Dec. 20, 1974).
147. 501 F.2d 757, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (concurring & dissenting).
148. Id. at 771.
149. Civil No. 73-2553 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 1, 1974).
150. Pesikoff v. United States Dep't of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 765 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974). Judge MacKinnon, however, re-
gards a statement in the Secretary's brief that the reports of the Texas Em-
ployment Commission are neither conclusive nor efficient as self-impeach-
ing and would have remanded for sounder evidence.
151. 329 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
tary school teachers occurred by utilizing a job order pursuant to
which only three people showed up for interviews, none of whom
later submitted transcripts. This situation was held to be good evi-
dence that no United States workers were able and willing to accept
the employment.
152
In Ratnayake v. Mack,153 impeaching evidence came from an un-
usual source, the United States Commissioner of Education. In re-
sponse to the RMA's position that it was unreasonable to require
two years' training by a Montessori school certified by the Associa-
tion Montessori Internationale as a job prerequisite, plaintiffs pro-
duced a letter from the Commissioner advising that it was cer-
tainly not unreasonable to require extensive training. The letter
also indicated that there was a shortage of trained Montessori
teachers.
Discovery of Available Data
Courts have been fairly uniform in allowing the applicant or his
employer to discover any data utilized by the Department of Labor
in deciding the labor certification application. 4 In Secretary of
Labor v. Farino,155 the Regional Manpower Administrator was peti-
tioned under the Freedom of Information Act'58 for the names of
available unemployed people with the qualifications demanded by
the job offers made by the plaintiffs. The information had been
given to the certifying officer by the Illinois State Employment
Service. The petition was denied by the district court. The court
of appeals reversed and noted that the regulations' 57 were designed
to reduce rather than expand the scope of exceptions to the Free-
dom of Information Act. 58 A similar claim of privilege which the
district court sustained was made in Doraisuamy v. Secretary of La-
bor.159 The matter is now pending on appeal in the District of
Columbia Circuit, and it remains to be seen if the court will follow
Farino and its progeny. However, the labor department continues
152. See Seo v. United States Dep't of Labor, 523 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975);
Silva v. Secretary of Labor, 518 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1975).
153. 499 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1974).
154. See, e.g., Khandwala v. RMA, Civil No. 75-4300 (N.D. Ill., May 4,
1976).
155. 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (1976).
157. 29 C.F.R. § 70.22(b) (1976) (the Department of Labor's policy state-
ment regarding the Freedom of Information Act).
158. Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885, 893 (7th Cir. 1973).
159. Civil No. 74-37 (D.D.C., June 7, 1974), appeal docketed Civil No.
74-1847, D.C. Cir., July 26, 1974.
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to refuse to disclose the names of individuals registered with state
employment services. 0 0
Burden of Proof
The labor certification requirement states that an alien seeking to
enter the United States to work is excludable
unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the
Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers in the
United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available.
••161
Questions have arisen concerning which party has the burden of
proving that "there are not sufficient workers."'162 Prior to the 1965
Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, the law was
structured to permit workers to enter unless the Secretary of Labor
certified that sufficient American workers were available to per-
form such labor or that the employment of aliens would adversely
affect the wages and working conditions of American workers.
16 3
There is no dispute that under that provision an affirmative duty
was placed upon the Secretary of Labor to initiate the procedure
and to prove the availability of American workers before an alien
was excludable under the 1952 provision.6 4
By its shift in wording the 1965 Amendment placed the burden of
initiating the procedure for labor certification upon the alien appli-
cant. In Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, the majority of the court
concluded that the 1965 Amendment also placed the burden of prov-
ing that "there are not sufficient workers" upon the alien applicant
for labor certification. 65 Pesikoff has been cited for this proposi-
160. The Department of Labor continues to rely on the same bases for
nondisclosure as was found inapplicable in Farino (29 C.F.R. § 70.22(b)
(1976)) as well as on id. § 70.26(b) (4). For discussion of arguments which
may *be used to compel disclosure, see 52 IN=RETER RELEASEs 229-32
(1975).
161. L & N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (1970).
162. Compare Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 1038 (1974), with Sherwin-Williams Company v.
RMA, Civil No. 76-220, at 5 (N.D. Ill., May 1976).
163. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a) (14), 66 Stat. 183, as amended
I. & N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (1970).
164. E.g., Jersey Plastic Molders, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Civil No. 74-
485, at 8 (D.N.J., July 2, 1975) (designated "Not for Publication").
165. 501 F.2d at 761 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 1038 (1974).
tion with approval by several decisions. 166 But the overwhelming
majority of cases 16 7 recognize that:
Since it is not feasible for an employer to affirmatively and conclu-
sively show that acceptable alternative American workers do not
exist, the denial of certification must rest on some meaningful evi-
dence.168
The reference to "some meaningful evidence" indicates the crux of
the problem. The Pesikoff majority would have the applicant carry
the ultimate burden of persuasion that no American workers meet
the statutory standards of able, available, willing, and qualified.
That is, the applicant would have to prove the "existence of the
non-existant."'- 69
Other courts have adopted a different standard. When Labor
does produce some evidence, the burden of proof shifts to the
alien to rebut that evidence. If the evidence produced by Labor
in support of denial is demonstrated not to be arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law after
a thorough, probing, in-depth review, their denial of certification
will be upheld. 17 0  Otherwise reversal is required. 171 If there is
any indication that the evidence does not establish that there are
American workers who are "able, willing, qualified, and available,"
the burden is on the Department of Labor to prove there are Ameri-
can workers.172 It is submitted that part of the difference in the
language of the cases has to do with the way the court views the
166. Acupuncture Center of Washington v. Dunlop, Civil No. 74-1050
(D.C. Cir., Jan. 16, 1976), rev'g, 364 F. Supp. 1038 (D.D.C. 1973); Silva v.
Secretary of Labor, 518 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1975); Witt v. Secretary of Labor,
397 F. Supp. 673 (D. Me. 1975); Yusuf v. RMA, 390 F. Supp. 292 (W.D.
Va. 1975). Witt curiously cites Pesikoff for the proposition that the burden
placed on the alien "is well established." 397 F. Supp. at 679.
167. For a partial listing of cases placing the burden of establishing the
existence of United States workers meeting the standards of I. & N. Act
§ 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1970), upon the Secretary of Labor,
see Yusuf v. RMA, 490 F. Supp. 292, 295 (W.D. Va. 1975).
168. Sherwin-Williams Company v. RMA, Civil No. 220, at 7 (N.D. IlL,
May 1976).
169. Id. at 6.
170. E.g., Khandwala v. RMA, Civil No. 75-4300 (N.D. Ill., May 4, 1976).
The standard here enunciated is the one set forth in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
171. E.g., Shuk Yee Chan v. RMA, 521 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1975).
172. E.g., Seo v. United States Dep't of Labor, 523 F.2d 10 (9th Cir.
1975); Shuk Yee Chan v. RMA, 521 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1975); First Girl, Inc.
v. RMA, 499 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1974); Ratnayake v. Mack, 499 F.2d 1207 (8th
Cir. 1974); Digilab, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 495 F.2d 323 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); Reddy, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor,
492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974); Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885
(7th Cir. 1973).
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evidence. For example, the Seventh Circuit has essentially estab-
lished a presumption (perhaps irrebutable) that State Employment
Service data is not reliable to prove actual availability. 173 However
the majority position is that if burden of proof is defined in terms
of who prevails if the evidence is equally weighted for each side,
the certifying officer must carry the ultimate burden of proving
unavailability of qualified, able, and willing American workers. 7 4
JUDICIAL REvizw
Jurisdiction
United States district courts commonly find jurisdiction in labor
certification cases pursuant to Section 10A of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), which provides:
Any person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. 75
However, in many cases this jurisdictional base is joined with the
Declaratory Judgment Act,' 76 and occasionally with the Mandamus
and Venue Act of 1962.177 In Naporano v. Secretary of Labor,78
jurisdiction was not found under either the APA or the Declara-
tory Judgment Act, but was found under the Mandamus and Venue
Act. Apparently, the Third Circuit is the only circuit which utilizes
this jurisdictional basis. Jurisdiction may also be founded on sec-
tion 279 of the Act,179 which gives district courts jurisdiction over
173. See note 113 supra for a partial discussion of the progression of this
presumption.
174. Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 771 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 1038 (1974). Curiously the clearest, most concise state-
ment about the ultimate burden of proof being on the labor department is
contained in the dissenting opinion of the one case which clearly placed the
ultimate burden of proof of "unavailability" on the applicant.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
177. Ird. § 1361.
178. 529 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1976). For its jurisdictional proposition, the
court cites Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). The Third Circuit does not recognize section 10 of the APA
as providing an independent source of jurisdiction. See Zimmerman v.
United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1970), concerning Third Circuit juris-
diction and Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d
529 (8th Cir. 1967), concerning Eighth Circuit jurisdiction.
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1970).
any case arising under Title H of the Act, in which the labor certifi-
cation requirement appears. The argument (still occasionally made
by the Department of Labor) that a denial of a labor certification
is unreviewable because it is a matter committed by law to agency
discretion and thus exempt from the APA, is no longer tenable.180
Standing to Sue
Two early cases, Braude v. Wirtz 81 and Cobb v. Murrell,8 2 held
that neither the alien nor his employer had standing to challenge
the denial of a labor certification. However, both cases are now
inapplicable because of the Supreme Court's intervening decisions
in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe'8 3 and Association
of Data Processing Services v. Camp.18 4 Currently, both the em-
ployer and the alien have standing to sue.188
Standing may continue to be a problem in certain fact situations.
In Rumahorbo v. Secretary of Labor,180 the alien was physically
outside the United States and did not have a definite job offer. He
alleged that he desired to work as a teacher in Coredale, Crisp
County, Georgia but that he had not been hired by the school dis-
trict. He was found to lack standing because of a failure to show
a "case controversy"; his injury was deemed hypothetical and spec-
ulative. If the alien had had a definite job offer, his employer could
have sued without any question of standing.
In Intercontinental Placement Service v. Shultz,187 plaintiff was
an employment agency which for a fee located specific jobs in the
United States for aliens. The court found that Congress did not
intend to protect such an interest, and, therefore, the agency failed
the test enunciated in Data Processing Services. Actual employers,
however, could have challenged the denials. Absent the specific ob-
180. See, e.g., Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 1038 (1974); Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d
885 (7th Cir. 1973).
181. 350 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965).
182. 386 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1967).
183. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
184. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
185. Because of Braude and Cobb, almost every labor certification case
discusses the issue of standing. Good discussions are found in Pesikoff v.
Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 1038
(1974), and Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973). The
Fifth Circuit specifically overruled Cobb in Reddy v. Secretary of Labor,
492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974).
186. 390 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1975).
187. 461 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1972).
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jections of Rumahorbo and Intercontinental, it is fair to assume that
both the alien and his employer will have standing to sue.
Scope of Judicial Review
With limited exception, 8 8 most courts which have considered the
scope of their power to review denials of labor certification applica-
tions have concluded that they are governed by section 10 (e) (2) (A)
of the Administrative Procedure Act. 8 9 Courts have reached this
conclusion by relying on the reasoning set forth in Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe,190 Secretary of Labor v. Farino,191 or
by independent judicial determination. 92 Thus, a reviewing court
must determine whether the labor department's decision is
"arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law." To
make such a finding the district court must consider whether the
Secretary's decision "was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."
Nevertheless, "the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one,"
and the district court may not "substitute its judgment for that of
the agency." 193
However,
Even though the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption
of regularity, his action is not to be shielded "from a thorough,
probing, in-depth review."194
188. E.g., Golabek v. RMA, 329 F. Supp. 892 (D. Pa. 1971).
189. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
190. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
191. 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973). The cases citing Farino with approval
of scope of judicial review are: Seo v. United States Dep't of Labor, 523
F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975); Shuk Yee Chan v. RMA, 521 F.2d 592 (7th Cir.
1975); First Girl, Inc. v. RvA, 499 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1974); Reddy v. Sec-
retary of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974); Gaijar v. RIMA, Civil No. 75-
4299 (N.D. Ill., May 7, 1976); Sherwin-Williams Company v. RMA, Civil
No. 76-220 (N.D. Il., May 4, 1976); Khandwala v. RMA, Civil No. 75-4300
(N.D. Ill., May 4, 1976); Hanif v. RMA, Civil No. 73-2553 (N.D. Ill., Feb.
1, 1974 ); Witt v. Secretary of Labor, 397 F. Supp. 673 (D. Me. 1975). See
also Bitang v. RMA, 351 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
192. Silva v. Secretary of Labor, 518 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1975); Yong v.
RMA, 509 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1975); Ratnayake v. Mack, 499 F.2d 1207 (8th
Cir. 1974); Yusuf v. RMA, 390 F. Supp. 292 (W.D. Va. 1975); Ozbirman v.
RMA, 335 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
193. Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 885, 889 (7th Cir. 1973), citing Cit-
izens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
194. 490 F.2d at 889.
The evidence presented at the district court proceeding should in-
clude the administrative record and whatever impeaching evidence
dehors the record that the petitioner could have presented "at the
time of the administrative proceeding but for which no opportunity
was afforded."' 195 Counsel should also present any evidentiary
material arising after the administrative hearing if it tends to prove
job market conditions during the time of agency proceedings. 90
Abuse of discretion is a factual determination in each case and
depends, in large part, upon the particular reviewing court's con-
cept of the certification process, particularly the nature of the
burdens to be carried by each party.'19
Two cases in the Third Circuit relied on the federal mandamus
statute for jurisdiction,198 but utilized the same standard of review
as the cases relying on the APA. One case held that when a claim
of non-permissible exercise of discretion was at issue, the courts
were to inquire into the scope of authority and ensure that the offi-
cial "did not abuse his discretion by transgressing the authority ac-
tually delegated to him."'199 In Naporano v. Secretary of Labor,200
the court indicated that Labor had "no discretion to review" in de-
termining the proper wage necessary to avoid adversely affecting
working conditions when the alien was being paid the union wage.
Judicial Remedy
If the reviewing court has determined that certification has been
improperly denied, it can either order the issuance of labor certifi-
cation or remand the matter to the Assistant RMA for final adjudi-
cation. Secretary of Labor v. Farino is the leading case in this area.
In Farino the court extensively discussed the authority for the two
available remedies 201 and concluded that remand was the better
195. Baig v. RMA, Civil No. 74-550, at 2 (N.D. I, Dec. 20, 1974).
196. At least in those jurisdictions where the courts require the certifica-
tion decision to be made based on job market conditions at time of remand,
current job market data should also be admissible. See text accompanying
notes 201-08 infra.
197. Compare Xytex Corp. v. Schliemann, 382 F. Supp. 50 (D. Colo.
1974), with Acupuncture Center of Washington v. Dunlop, Civil No. 73-635
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
198. Naporano Metal & Iron Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 529 F.2d 537
(1976) and Jersey Plastic Molders, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Civil No. 74-
845 (D.N.J., July 2, 1975) (designated "Not for Publication").
199. Jersey Plastic Molders, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Civil No. 74-485,
at 4-5 (D.N.J., July 2, 1975) (designated "Not for Publication").
200. 529 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1976).
201. 490 F.2d at 891-92. The essential basis for issuance would be
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procedure in labor certification cases.
20 2
The majority of courts which have considered the issue have fol-
lowed the Farino reasoning and have ordered a remand.20 3 In most
of these cases the remand is "for further consideration not incon-
sistent with the opinion. '204 This language indicates that the
Assistant RMA must make his decision based on the record as it
existed at the time of the district court proceedings. However, some
cases have required the decision to be based on the employment
situation at the time of reconsideration. 205 The Ninth Circuit in
Seo v. United States Department of Labor20 6 found this objection-
able because of possible inequities which could have resulted from
changes in the job market during litigation.
The reasoning of the Seo court is applicable in cases in which
the court determines that certification should have been issued.
Few courts have taken the opportunity to order issuance of labor
certification after deciding that the administrative decision was an
abuse of discretion.20 7 However, other courts may be persuaded to
order issuance because of the resolute position adopted by coun-
sel for the Department of Labor. In Naparano counsel for the Sec-
retary stated at oral argument (apparently after being asked what
would happen on remand if the decision held the wage rate being
paid plaintiff was not adverse) that remand merely would result
in another denial of certification.20
8
trial de novo based on plaintiffs evidence of abuse of discretion, the admin-
istrative record, and the provisions of sections 10 (e) (1) and 10(e) (2) (F)
of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1967). Remand is, according to Farino, author-
ized by APA section 706, if the reviewing court may set aside agency
station, and section 703, providing the "proceedings for judicial review is
... any applicable form of legal action." 490 F.2d at 889.
202. Id. at 892.
203. See case cited note 184 supra. In addition, all cases cited in this
article but not discussed in the remainder of the section on judicial remedy
have usually ordered remand.
204. Khandwala v. RMA, Civil No. 75-4300 (N.D. Ill., May 4, 1976).
205. E.g., Reddy v. Secretary of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974);
Xytex Corp. v. Schliemann, 382 F. Supp. 50 (D. Colo. 1974).
206. 523 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975).
207. Naporano v. Secretary of Labor, 529 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1976); Jersey
Plastic Molders, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Civil No. 74-485 (D.N.J., July 2,
1975) (designated "Not for Publication"); and Golabek v. RMA, 329 F.
Supp. 892 (D. Pa. 1971) ordered certification to issue.
208. 529 F.2d at 542.
CONCLUSION
Because of the widespread criticism which has arisen over the
manner in which the Department of Labor has administered the
labor certification requirement, the Secretary of Labor should im-
mediately take two steps: (1) The Secretary should upgrade the
quality of evidence used by the Department of Labor in adjudicat-
ing labor certification applications; and (2) the Secretary should
promulgate detailed regulations and operations instructions which
would be made available to the public.
20 9
Even the Secretary of Labor understands the inadequacy of using
State Employment Service Statistics. As counsel for the Secretary
stated in their brief in Pesikoff:
[A]ppellants would like the Court to rely on the statement of the
[Texas] Employment Commission. As anyone who has dealt with
the state employment commissions knows, they are not a final and
conclusive, nor even an efficient, repository for information with
regard to positions and employees available. They exist primarily
to administer unemployment compensation programs.210
The need for promulgating more detailed regulations and other
public guidance could not be stated more succinctly than did the
Silva court.
We can appreciate that there are problems of delicacy in adjusting
the needs of United States employers to those of resident workers.
But in an area where the Secretary has considerable power under
general statutory standards and must decide numerous cases in a
routine-fashion, the clarification of policy through rules or pub-
lished pronouncements would protect against arbitrary action.211
Absent the implementation of these recommendations, the courts
will undoubtedly continue to overturn many of the labor certifica-
tion denials brought before them because those denials are adverse
to the requirements and purposes of the statute and the public
interest embodied in section 212 (a) (14) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
209. On November 5, 1976, proposed regulations appeared in the Federal
Register, 41 Fed. Reg. 48938 (1976). These regulations if finally adopted
may alleviate some of the problems which have occurred in the past.
210. Brief for Appellee at 17, Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d
757, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
211. 518 F.2d at 311. See also note 72 supra.
